Critical Theory Tuesdays: Descartes, Wittgenstein, and the Fallacy of Skepticism

The notion of skepticism in regards to the existence of an external world – a concrete, finite, tangible world beyond the jurisdiction of human senses – is based on the actuality that any knowledge claim can be doubted. In the face of doubt’s omnipotence, even the endeavor to justify a knowledge claim becomes futile. Traditionally, epistemology has sought a fundamental architecture of certain knowledge, or in Kantian terms, an objective a priori truth. This post-Cartesian climate of western philosophy, however, has made it impossible to envisage any knowledge that is impervious to all potential skepticism. Descartes changed the face of modern thought through doubting the truth of everything. He blatantly rejected evidence acquired through the senses – which eventually lead him to question the fundamental process of reasoning ad infinitum. Theory itself was catalyzed by Descartes’ revolutionary thought. Because of Descartes, critical theory has become a multi-faceted discipline that acts as the driving force behind the edge of skeptical criticism in modern academia.

But Wittgenstein flagrantly challenges Descartes’ notion of doubt. Wittgenstein states that declarations like “here is a hand” or “the world has existed for more than five minutes,” exhibit more commonalities with logical propositions despite possessing the form of empirical ones. These specific statements appear to reveal something factual about the world, and according to Descartes, they would therefore be susceptible to doubt. Wittgenstein, however, believes that they serve a function within the architecture of language. Within this linguistic structure, empirical propositions are granted the ability to make sense. The idea is not to claim certain knowledge of the aforementioned propositions, but rather to recognize that these propositions extend beyond the realm of doubt, uncertainty, and questioning knowledge.

In other words, such propositions are assumed by users of language as absolutes to aid in the ability of speech. Through the assumption of these truths, it is possible to speak with a greater accuracy and understanding of the world. These propositions aren’t intended to be scrutinized – they are merely building blocks – enablers of communication. Wittgenstein metaphorically compares these propositions to door hinges – tools which must remain fixed in order for the door of language to be functional.

Wittgenstein doesn’t attempt to refute doubts about the existence of an external world so much as he seeks to circumnavigate them. He illustrates that the doubts themselves do not function as they are intended. Wittgenstein gives propositions a structural role in language by assuming that said propositions are logical by nature. According to Wittgenstein, they define how language, and therefore thought, functions. “Here is a hand” is an ostensive definition. This statement explicates how the moniker hand is to be merely functional rather than assuming an empirical claim about the actual presence of a hand. If humans begin to doubt this fundamental linguistic structure, then the whole structure of language, internal and external, comes apart. If two individuals cannot agree over the existence of a hand, it therefore becomes impossible to assume that they can agree on anything – this includes common understanding that could serve as shared ground upon which they would be able to debate the matter. Rational thought and communication are only possible between individuals when there is some sort of mutual understanding, and when one doubts such fundamental propositions as “here is a hand,” that common ground dissipates into the ether. Skepticism purports its occurrence within a framework of rational debate. Through extensive doubt, however, skepticism undermines rationality itself, and thus undermines the very basis for doubt. In regards to the external world, doubt is never more than hypothetical and, as such, it cannot really be classified as ‘doubt’ at all. Doubting, as an action, negates the ability of the doubter to doubt.

-- J. Henry,  February 2011

Works consulted:

Meditations -- René Descartes
On Certainty -- Ludwig Wittgenstein